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ABSTRACT 
The prosecutor wields tremendous 
power within the American 
criminal justice system. When that 
power is misused-particularly in 
capital cases-tremendous 
injustices are perpetrated. Yet, 
occurrences of prosecutorial 
misconduct seem to occur with 
distressing regularity. 
An exhaustive study covering 
appeals from 1973-95 revealed 
that two-thirds of overturned 
death penalties in the United 
States resulted from overzealous 
police and prosecutors who 
withheld exculpatory evidence. 
Our study covered 55 Kentucky 
cases from 1976-2000 and found 
evidence of prosecutorial 
misconduct in nearly one-half of 
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them, often with several instances 
per case. 
Introduction 
It is a travesty of justice and a moral outrage 
whenever a defendant is convicted of a capital offense due 
to prosecutorial misconduct. This inevitably leads to an 
erosion of public confidence in the justice system, hence, 
the compelling need for constant monitoring of the judicial 
process and more especially for scholarly investigations of 
prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases, taking 
into account the paucity of social science and legal 
research on this issue. Such scholarly responses are also 
justified on the additional grounds that it is, 
unquestionably, the professional expectation among 
lawyers and judges that a prosecutor's preeminent 
obligation is that of a "minister of justice'" which obliges 
him/her to seek justice for all the parties (a key dimension 
of which is the vindication of the innocent at all costs) and 
also to guarantee the defendant's right of due process in 
capital cases, now elevated to the level of "super due 
process" by the United States Supreme Court (Woodson v. 
North Carolina).' Accordingly, where prosecutorial 
conduct falls far short of this expectation there arises a 
compelling need for professional accountability and 
censure. Despite the admonition of the U.s. Supreme 
Court that prosecutorial wrongdoing may be grounds for 
criminal liability as well as disbarment (Imbler v. 
Pachtman)l, a study published in the Chicago Tribune on 
January 10,1999 found that nationwide, since 1963, three 
hundred and eighty-one (381) homicide cases were 
reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence negating 
guilt and know'lngly presented false evidence. Of those 
381 defendants, 67 were sentenced to death, and of the 67, 
nearly half were later released. None of the prosecutors in 
those cases faced criminal charges or disbarment.' To the 
same effect was a finding from a study done by Amnesty 
International in 1998, which documented numerous capital 
cases in the state of Texas where prosecutors were guilty 
of concealing evidence favorable to the defendant from 
defense attorneys "in contravention of their legal and 
ethical obligations" under the Brady doctrine,S and of 
engaging in improper argument to the capital jurors. 
Significantly, judicial decisions in Kentucky dating 
back to 1931, notably jackson v. Commonwealth', Goffv. 
Commonwealth', King v. Commonwealth8, and Stasell v. 
Commonwealth', had determined that prosecutors had 
engaged in improper arguments to capital juries, especially 
urging them to impose the death penalty in cases because 
the "community demands it." Recently, the most far-
reach'lng study to date of the death penalty in the United 
States covering appeals in all capital cases from 1973-
1995 conducted by a team of lawyers and criminologists 
found that 2 out of 3 convictions were overturned on 
appeal mostly because of serious errors by, amongst 
others, overzealous police and prosecutors who withheld 
evidence." Their central findings included the following: 
Nationally, during the 23-year study period, the 
overall rate of prejudicial error in American capital 
punishment was 68 %, that is to say, the courts 
found serious, reversible errors in nearly 7 of every 
10 of the thousands of capital sentences that were 
fully reviewed during the period, 
To lead to reversal, error must be serious, indeed, 
The most common errors prompting a majority of 
reversals at the state post-conviction stage include 
mainly police or prosecutorial misconduct in the 
form of suppression of evidence favorable to the 
defendants and essentially of an exculpatory 
nature, 
High errors put many individuals at risk of 
wrongful execution: 82% of the people whose 
capital judgments were overturned by state post-
conviction courts due to serious error were found 
to deserve sentences less than death when the 
errors were cured at retrial; 7% were found to be 
innocent of the capital crime. 
These are very revealing disclosures that indicate both the 
prominence of prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty 
cases in the United States and its disconcerting frequency. 
Cenceptuai and Legal Perspectives 
ofthe Prosecutorial Function 
To appreciate fully the problem of prosecutorial 
misconduct in the context of capital cases in Kentucky the 
study addressed the prosecutorial function from these key 
normative perspectives: international and comparative, 
definitional, the rule of law, and human rights. In essence, 
these perspectives provide the normative baselines against 
which prosecutorial misconduct was being measured and 
evaluated. In nearly all major criminal justice systems of 
the world, the prosecutor plays a critical role. 
Commensurate with this role are obligations and 
responsibilities of considerable implications for the rights 
and freedoms of individuals who as defendants come 
under the jurisdiction of the courts. Regardless of which 
principle (expediency, opportunity, or legality) actually 
motivates prosecutorial action or decision-making, the role 
of the prosecutor revolves around the exercise of 
discretionary powers.ll Though the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is not unique to the American 
criminal justice system, nowhere else in the world has the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion become a subject of 
more intense public debate and scholarly criticism in 
contemporary times than in the United States, the world's 
leading democracy. 
Academics, professionals and lay people have 
come to acknowledge not only the considerable nature of 
prosecutorial discretion in almost every phase of the 
criminal justice process in the U.s.; but also the far-
reaching implications of its abuse or wrongful exercise. A 
major area where these are manifest is that of the 
prosecution of death penalty cases. Since a capital 
sentence is the "ultimate punishment," it is from this 
standpoint that the phenomenon of prosecutorial 
misconduct can be perceived as having had its most 
disturbing impact. Hence, the focus of our study: the 
prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt or 
penalty phase of capital cases in Kentucky during the 
period 1976 to 2000. 
From a general international legal perspective, the 
important position that the prosecutor occupies as a 
pri~cipal player in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms can be deduced 
from the gUidelines promulgated in 1990 by the United 
Nations at its Eighth Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and Treatment of Offenders. To underscore its centrality, 
the prosecutorial function is depicted as a crucial role in the 
administration of justice. Several provisions explicitly and 
emphatically reflect the threefold tenet (whether the 
criminal proceeding is non-capital or one where the 
defendant has the risk of having "the ultimate penalty" 
imposed) that it is the obligation of the prosecutor: (a) to 
act in accordance with the law, fairly, consistently and 
expeditiously, and to respect, protect and uphold human 
rights; (b) to refrain from using illegally obtained evidence 
or evidence of a grossly prejudicial nature against 
defendants; and (c) to act fairly and impartially throughout 
both the trial and sentencing phases of a criminal case. In 
essence, there is international acknowledgement that the 
supreme obligation of the prosecutor in a criminal case is to 
convict the guilty and v'lndicate the innocent. A logical 
corollary of this international recognition of the 
prosecutorial function is, in the authors' opinion, that 
violations of their ethical duties by prosecutors constitute 
grave threats to the protection and enforcement of human 
rights. 
In addition to its international recognition, the role 
of the prosecutor in American and English criminal justice 
is of considerable preeminence. Historically, the American 
profile of the prosecutorial role has an ancestral linkage 
with its British counterpart, hence, their juridicial affinity. 
Ad mittedly, in the contemporary context of American 
criminal justice, it is difficult to articulate precisely the 
nature and scope of the prosecutorial function for two 
main reasons. First, the prevalence of flex'lble and often 
times ambi.9uous statutory, judicial, and professional 
gUidelines. Second, the role played by pragmatism and 
expediency in the evolution and development of this very 
important American institution. This difficulty was alluded 
to by Steven Phillips, a former assistant district attorney in 
Bronx County, New York, in his definition of the 
prosecutorial role as reflecting a tremendous ambivalence-
almost a schizophrenia; on the one hand, as a trial 
advocate, expected to do everything in his power to obtain 
convictions and on the other hand, as sworn to administer 
justice dispassi'onately, to seek humane dispositions rather 
than to blindly extract every last drop of punishment from 
every case." 
Analogously, in Britain, the prosecutor enjoys 
tremendous discretionary powers, the exercise of which 
revolves around the acknowledgement and recognition of 
two specific criteria: whether there is sufficient evidence to 
warrant prosecution (the "realistic prospects of 
conviction" test) and whether prosecution is deemed to be 
in the public interest.l3 Even far afield in the Romano-
Germanic or civil law system, notably Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, and Scotland, prosecutors enjoy 
equally enormous discretionary powers during both the 
trial and sentencing phases of a criminal case as those of 
their American and English counterparts l {, 
The study shows that the American profile of the 
prosecutorial role can be inferred from both the American 
Bar Association Recommended Prosecution Function 
Standards (which though never adopted still carry some 
weight) and isolated judicial pronouncements on the 
nature and scope of the prosecutor's role in American 
society. According to the American Bar Association 
Function Standards, the prosecutor is "an administrator of 
justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court" whose 
obligation is to "exercise sound discretion in the 
performance of his/her functions," whose primary 
objective is to "seek justice, not merely to convict." This 
portrayal of the prosecutorial function received the highest 
and most authoritative judicial endorsement in the 
landmark case of Berger v. United 5tates15 thus: 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not 
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially 
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a particular 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the 
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor-indeed he should do so. 
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction, as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one." 
A similar judicial conception of the prosecutorial 
function was articulated in the case of the Attorney 
General v. Tufts.l7 There, the High Court of Massachusetts 
described the powers enjoyed by district attorneys in these 
terms: 
Powers so great impose responsibilities 
correspondingly grave. They demand character 
incomparable, reputation unsullied, a high 
standard of professional ethics, and sound 
judgement of no mean order ... the office is ... to be 
held and administered wholly in the interests of 
the people at large and with a single eye to their 
welfare. 
Consistent with the above analysis, it is 
noteworthy that a not dissimilar portrayal of the Kentucky 
profile of the Commonwealth Attorney is deducible also 
from the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
official portrait is that of a minister of justice and not 
simply that of an advocate, whose responsibility is to 
ensure that the defendant is accorded procedural justice 
and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence. Ample judicial support for this conception of the 
prosecutorial role in the courts of Kentucky dates as far 
back as the 1920's. One of the earliest decisions was 
Bailey v. Commonwealth!' where the Court observed that: 
The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not 
to persecute, but to prosecute, and that he should 
endeavor to protect the innocent as well as 
prosecute the guilty, and should always be 
interested in seeing that the truth and the right 
shall prevail. 
In Lickliter v. Commonwealth" it was likewise 
noted that the prosecuting attorney's duty is to see that 
justice is done and nothing more. A more modern judiCial 
exposition of the Commonwealth Attorney's role is found 
in the case of Niemeyer v Commonwealth.'o There, the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky characterized the office in 
these terms: 
One of the finest offices the public can 
give to a member of the legal profession in this 
state is that of Commonwealth's Attorney. Its very 
status becomes a mantle of great power and 
respect to the wearer. Though few are apt to wear 
it lightly, some forget, or apparently never learn, to 
wear it humbly. No one except for the judge 
himself is under a stricter obligation to see that 
. every defendant receives a fair tria/, which means 
the law as laid down by the duly constituted 
authorities and not as the prosecuting attorney 
may think it ought to be. 
The recurring theme underlying the analyses so far 
of the prosecutorial role is that there are clear ethical 
obligations attaching to the prosecutorial office. Based on 
this premise, it can be asserted that grave breaches of 
prosecutorial ethics are per se instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct, though, admittedly, there are varying degrees 
of such misconduct. 
Accordingly, the authors developed a broad 
operational definition of the concept of prosecutorial 
misconduct encompassing serious deviations from the 
ethical obligations of the prosecutor, and providing some 
latitude for the concept not to be treated as having a fixed 
meaning, but as one whose categories are inexhaustive, 
varying with the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case in light of the applicable norms and values regulating 
prosecutorial conduct and performance. In effect, 
according to the authors, prosecutorial misconduct should 
be perceived as a gross violation of a prosecutor's 
professional obligations and responsibilities including the 
ethical duties concomitant with the office. 
In the context of the research, the contours of 
prosecutorial improprieties occurring during the guilt and 
penalty phases covered a wide range of activities including: 
suppressing evidence; using fake evidence; lying to the jury 
about defendant's past criminal history"; concealing 
exculpatory evidence and failing to turn over to the 
defense or the court exculpatory material;" making off-
the-record comments about uncharged conduct or matters 
conducted before a grand jury; improper closing 
arguments"; commenting on a defendant's silence; 
knowingly or intentionally alluding to irrelevant or 
inadmissible matter, or misleading the jury as to inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence; and using arguments and 
introducing evidence calculated to inflame the passions of 
the"jury." 
The adverse impact prosecutorial misconduct has 
on the rule of law and the concept of human rights can be 
no greater and more repercussive than during the guilt 
and/or penalty phase of a death penalty case. From the 
perspective of the rule of law, due to the tremendous 
accretion of prosecutorial discretions enjoyed by 
prosecutors in the U.s. and the lack of well-crafted and 
effective legislative and judicial safeguards against 
prosecutorial excesses, it is a grave threat to the rule of law 
whenever a defendant is convicted of a capital offense, not 
exclusively on the basis of sufficiency of evidence but due, 
in part, to prosecutorial misbehavior. A system that 
accords primacy to human dignity, due process, and equal 
protection, as does the American constitutional system, 
cannot be insensitive to threats from within a system 
evidently designed to protect the value and concept of 
human rights. Where prosecutorial misconduct becomes, 
in the familiar legal metaphor, "an unruly horse" it can 
gravely endanger the concept of human rights thereby 
depriving the criminal law, in language reminiscent of 
Blackstone, of its quintessential procedural safeguards to 
the "trichotomy of life, liberty, and property."lS "When this 
happens, the justice process cannot escape censure for 
being a facilitator or an engine of injustice."" 
Research Objectives 
The specific issues addressed by the research study 
were: 
1. Whether prosecutorial misconduct has occurred in 
capital cases in the Commonwealth of Kentucky; 
f. 
2. If there is evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in 
this context, then how prevalent is the 
misconduct; 
3. If there is evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in 
this context, then what are the most prevalent 
forms of misconduct; and 
4. Whether the frequency of prosecutorial 
misconduct in this context warrants the 
development and implementation of remedial 
measures. 
Methodology 
In developing the methodology for the study, it 
was necessary to select the parameters of the time frame 
for the data. Making this determination required taking 
into consideration that in 1972 the United States Supreme 
Court held that the death penalty as administered in the 
United States violated the Eighth Amendment's 
proscription against the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment" Subsequently, in 1976 the Court held that 
the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional and 
approved the new capital sentencing scheme enacted by 
the Georgia legislature in response to the Court's opinion 
in Furman28 On December 22, 1976, the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky adopted a capital sentencing scheme" similar to 
that approved by the Court in Gregg Consequently, in 
order for a capital case to be deemed eligible for the study 
the death sentence had to be imposed after the activation 
of Kentucky's newly adopted death penalty legislation. At 
the other end of the time frame spectrum, the authors 
decided that in order to qualify the death sentence in a 
capital case had to have been imposed before June 30, 
2000, 
After identifying which cases satisfied this 
eligibility requirement, the authors then had to ascertain 
which of these cases could progress to the qualifying 
stage, This required determining which of the eligible cases 
had, at the minimum, an opinion issued by the Kentucky 
Supreme Court responding to issues raised by the capital 
offender's ~utomatic direct appeal from the judgment and 
sentence entered by the capital trial judge,30 It was from 
this pool of qualifying cases that the data for the study was 
extrapolated, 
The judicial opinions of each case that advanced to 
'Inclusion in the pool of qualifying cases were then 
identified, located, and reviewed by the authors, The 
objective of the reviewing process was to determine 
whether evidence of prosecutorial misconduct existed in 
any of the cases. The authors devised three analytical 
categories to facilitate the evaluation of the cases in the 
qualifying pool. 
The first, and more objective, category focused on 
whether the offender raised and the judiciary expressly 
acknowledged the presence of prosecutorial actions that 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct that was the sole 
basis or contributing factor for reversal. The second 
category encompassed situations where the reviewing 
court expressly mentioned the issue raised by the 
condemned person in terms of possibly constituting 
prosecutorial misconduct, but relied upon other grounds to 
reverse the case. In the third, and more subjective 
category while the objected behavior had not been 
formally labeled prosecutorial misconduct, it, nonetheless 
could be reasonably inferred that the prosecutor's actions 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct. For example, under 
the third category the authors might agree that 
prosecutorial misconduct existed in substance even 
though the reviewing court formally analyzed and 
discussed it under the legal rubric of admissibility of 
evidence. Furthermore, the authors had to concur on their 
independent assessment expressly or implicitly on an 
alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct before it 
could conclusively be deemed to be one of prosecutorial 
misconduct and consequently be subjected to further 
analysis. At this stage of the evaluative process, the 
authors determined the aggregate number of instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct, and the number of capital cases 
in which such conduct occurred." Due to the subjective 
attributes of the third category the authors engaged in a 
vigorous debate about the final designation of the 
incidents identified in that category. To ensure the 
integrity of the study, the authors erred on the side of 
exclusion rather than inclusion. 
After identifying the cases in which prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred and the individual instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the authors reviewed them 
again with the objective of assigning them to one of three 
additional categories developed for the purpose of 
conducting this study. These three categories were 
designed to facilitate the completion of the study's 
analytical facet. The three categories are: eVidentiary; 
prosecutorial statements; and ethics/integrity. 
Subsequently, to enrich the depth of analysis, 
subcategories were developed for the evidentiary and 
prosecutorial statements categories and the relevant 
instances were assigned to the applicable general and 
subcategory. The evidentiary subcategories are: visual! 
audio presentations; victim impact statements; improper 
strategy; and exculpatory evidence. The prosecutorial 
statements subcategories are: undermining juro.r 
responsibility; statements designed to generate prejudice 
and passion among the jurors; misstating law or fact; 
expressing personal opinions; examining witnesses and 
misstating facts; commenting on the defendant's silence; 
and statements made during the capital jury voir dire. To 
further the study's integrity, the authors were very careful 
not to engage in "double-counting" when assigning an 
instance of prosecutorial misconduct to its appropriate 
category. Consequently, an instance of prosecutorial 
misconduct was assigned to only one category and when 
applicable to only one subcategory. 
Findings 
The authors identified sixty-nine (69) cases in 
which the death penalty was imposed during the relevant 
time_period. Thus, the pool of eligible cases was composed 
of sixty-nine (69) cases. This figure includes six (6) cases 
where three (3) offenders each had two (2) capital trials 
and death sentences were imposed in each ofthe six (6) 
separate trials. The authors determined that fifty-five (55), 
or 79.9%, of the eligible sixty-nine (69) cases satisfied the 
criteria for inclusion in the qualifying pooL" The authors 
then found evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in 47.3%, 
nearly one-half, of these fifty-five (55) qualifying cases." 
1. Analysis of Data 
The authors identified a total of fifty-five (55) 
separate instances of prosecutorial misconduct in these 
twenty-six (26) qualifying cases." The largest 
concentration of instances of prosecutorial misconduct 
were found in the prosecutorial statement category as 
thirty-four (34), or 61.82%, ofthe fifty-five (55) instances 
were assigned to this general category of misconduct." 
The next largest group of instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct, with eighteen (18) recorded instances, were 
found in the evidentiary category. The fewest instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct, with three (3) incidents were 
recorded in the ethics category." 
Accounting for nine (9) of the thirty-four (34) 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct due to statements 
made by prosecutors, the authors discovered that the jur~r 
responsibility subcategory of the prosecutorial statements 
category represents a significant problem area in 
prosecutorial misconduct amounting to a contravention of 
the constitutional principle announced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Caldwell. 37 There, the Court vacated a 
death sentence because the prosecutor improperly 
minimized the capital jurors "truly awesome" responsibility 
in determining the appropriate sentencing that it should 
not consider itself responsible if it sentenced the defendant 
to death since the death sentence would be automatically 
appealed and reviewed for correctness by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court. l8 Out of the thirty-four (34) eleven (11) 
were found to involve prosecutorial improprieties like 
expression of personal opinions (the so-called "golden rule" 
violation), commenting on the defendant's silence (in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination), impropriety during the jury voire dire, for 
example, failure on the part of the prosecutor to disclose 
jury bias. Evidentiary improprieties prevailed in eighteen 
(18) cases. They specifically concerned: improper 
strategies such as visual/audio representations, for 
example, the introduction of gruesome crime scene and 
autopsy photographs, improper use of victim impact 
statements, and the failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence. 
Under the ethics/integrity category, the authors 
referenced only cases where, for example, the reviewing 
court, as a result of a series of isolated instances of 
prosecutorial improprieties, characterized the prosecutor's 
trial tactics as being similar to a "guerilla warfare" 
culminating in a deprivation of the defendant's right to a 
fair trial. 
Conclusion 
The authors strongly maintain that, on the whole, the 
findings as reported support the conclusion that for the 
time period under review prosecutorial misconduct in 
capital cases in Kentucky was alarmingly prevalent. In 
summary, the authors strongly contend that their findings 
point irresistibly to the conclusion that prosecutorial 
misconduct poses a significant and serious problem in the 
adjudication of capital cases in Kentucky and requires a 
remedy. 
Recommendations for Remedying Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
Having determined that the existence of 
prosecutorial misconduct in capital cases requires the 
adoption and implementation of remedial measures, the 
authors decided that these remedies could best be 
examined if they were assigned to one of the following 
categories: professional remedies; judicial remedies; 
legislative remedies; and litigation remedies. 
In recommending remedies for prosecutorial 
misconduct it is necessary to describe briefly the capital 
review process. In Furman v. Georgia and in later cases, the 
U.S. Supreme Court required state high courts to review all 
death sentences on direct appeal. As a consequence, the 
law of nearly all states is that capital judgments be 
automatically appealed." In Kentucky, capital cases are 
appealed directly from the state circuit court to the 
Kentucky Supreme Court. 
Professional Remedies 
The authors take the view that the problem of 
combating prosecutorial impropriety by resorting to state 
bar disciplinary committees is legally oneof the effective 
existing available remedies. Utilizing this remedial tool, 
however, requires waging the battle on several fronts. 
First, at the professional level frequent, strict, and effective 
enforcement of existing disciplinary mechanisms must be 
invoked. Examples of professional disciplinary tools include 
the civil discipline of an offending prosecutor by the legal 
profession and bar associations; the grievance committees 
imposing disciplinary sanctions against a prosecutor, 
censure and temporary suspension from practice and 
permanent debarment." Former Chief Justice Burger 
wrote: "A bar association conscious of its public 
obligations would sua sponte call to account an attorney 
guilty of the misconduct shown here."" Unfortunately, bar 
associations do not frequently invoke their disciplinary 
powers as a corrective against prosecutorial misconduct. 
Judicial Remedies 
Before recommending judicial remedies to the 
pro.blems posed by prosecutorial misconduct it is helpful to 
review a critical aspect of the judicial review process in 
capital cases in order to appreciate how that interacts with 
the prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct and remedying 
it. In Gregg v. Georgia the United States Supreme Court 
approved Georgia's new capital sentencing scheme, which 
included the requirement that the conviction and death 
sentence in a capital case be automatically appealed to the 
Georgia Supreme Court, the highest appellate court in that 
state." Subsequently, nearly all states with the death 
penalty, including Kentucky, adopted a similar mandatory 
direct appeal rule1,3 
Reversal of a capital conviction or sentence on 
direct appeal requires a showing of" serious error." 
Regrettably, this requirement has led to the frequent 
application of the judicial doctrine of "harmless error" 
rendering nugatory explicit and unambiguous findings of 
grave prosecutorial misconduct. "Harmless error" exists if 
the wrongful action did not prejudice the offender's 
conviction or sentence. While a variety of factors can be 
relied upon in finding that the error was harmless, probably 
the most prevalent factor is the strength of the evidence 
against the defendant's innocence. The stronger the 
evidence of guilt is, then the more likely that the error will 
be considered harmless. Consequently, if an error is 
deemed "harmless," then that error is invalidated as a 
reason supporting a reversal." The authors contend that 
the most effective remedy against prosecutorial 
misconduct is the abolition of the "harmless error" 
doctrine. Such a doctrine is inconsistent with the principle 
of fundamental fairness and ought to be abolished if the 
courts are not to be perceived as "condoning prosecutorial 
lawlessnes~ and promoting disregard for the law."" 
Under the harmless error rule appellate courts are 
authorized to ignore trial errors that were not prejudicial to 
the defendant's substantive rights. Every jurisdiction has 
this rule." The application of the "harmless error" 
doctrine, like the principle of necessity, is tantamount to 
the exercise of a judicial dispensing power legitimizing 
prosecutorial impropriety which, by reference to the strict 
criteria of legality, is manifestly unfair or illegal. It is a 
result-oriented approach by the appellate courts, which 
shifts the focus from fairness to guilt. The practical 
consequences of the adoption of the remedy of abolition 
would be to render prosecutorial misconduct a perse error 
and thus, depending upon whether the prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred during the guilt or penalty phase of 
the capital trial proceedings, providing grounds for the 
reversal of the conviction or the death sentence.") 
Two other judicially-initiated remedies call for greater 
judicial intervention during the capital trial when the 
prosecutorial misconduct is occurring."a First, trial judges 
should enhance their vigilance with respect to sustaining 
defense objections to prosecutorial actions that do or 
could constitute prosecutorial misconduct." If the capital 
defense attorney fails to interject an objection, then the 
trial judge should have the responsibility of independently 
preventing the prosecutor from engaging in misconduct by 
objecting sua sponte to the proposed or completed 
activity. If the defense or trial judge has lodged the 
objection before the jury, and in the case of the defense, 
the objection has been sustained, then the issuance of a 
curative instruction is another judicial remedyso The other 
judicial remedy that has been proposed is for trial judges to 
promptly issue a "stern rebuke" to the prosecutor and if 
necessary impose repressive measures,51 such as holding 
the prosecutor in contempt of court or declaring a mistrial, 
in-order to punish the prosecutor for employing such 
tactics and to deter the prosecutor from re-engaging in 
misconduct during the trial. 
Post-Trial judicial Remedies 
There are several post-trial judicial remedial 
options. First, for particularly egregious instances of 
misconduct and/or for repeated instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the prosecutor's privilege of prosecuting in 
that judicial district could be revoked. Another post-trial 
remedy exists at the appellate level. If the reviewing court 
in a capital case determines that the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct during the proceedings, then in addition to 
describing the offending behavior, and possibly invoking 
the per se error rule, the justices should no longer allow 
transgressing prosecutors to be shielded by a cloak of 
anonymity. In other words, the offending prosecutor 
would be personally identified in capital appellate opinions. 
Furthermore, removing the protection provided by 
anonymity could be further enhanced if courts adopted a 
rule prohibiting reviewing courts from designating opinions 
as" nonpublishable" in cases where prosecutorial 
misconduct was found. 
Legislative Remedies 
Finally, proposed legislative sanctions for 
prosecutorial misconduct include (a) mandatory removal 
from office, (b) restructuring of the organization of the 
prosecution of capital cases so as to diminish the incidence 
of prosecutorial impropriety, (c) elimination or modification 
of the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, and (d) express 
criminalization of prosecutorial misconduct. 
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